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Proximity Detection Zones:
Designs to Prevent Fatalities Around Continuous Mining Machines
Peter T. Bissert, Jacob L. Carr, and Joseph P. DuCarme
Mine workers in an underground coal mine are exposed to many hazards and potential 
hazards on a daily basis such as unstable mine openings, coal and rock dust, high noise 
levels, fires and explosions, and heavy machinery. While many engineering and process 
controls have been established to mitigate the risks of these hazards, working with and in 
proximity to large, mobile equipment remains a significant risk to miner safety.
Some of the most hazardous jobs for an underground coal miner involve operating or 
working in the vicinity of continuous mining machines (CMMs). Since 1984, 39 miners 
have been killed when struck or pinned by a CMM (MSHA, 2015).
A common coal mining method in the U.S. is the room-and-pillar method, in which coal is 
cut and removed from the earth in a grid-like pattern of openings called entries and cross-
cuts (Figure 1). CMMs (Photo 1) are used extensively in room-and-pillar mining.
CMMs feature a large cutting drum that cuts coal from the seam, gathers it into the pan, and 
conveys it back through the boom for haulage (Figure 2). They are typically operated by 
remote control, allowing the operator to remain at a safe distance from the machine when 
coal is being cut from the solid formation. In many cases, due to limited visibility and space, 
operators may work in close proximity to a CMM. This may put the operator in danger of 
being struck by the machine or pinned between the machine and the ribs or roof (walls or 
ceiling of the mine opening).
To prevent such incidents, proximity detection systems have been developed and are now 
required on all CMMs in underground coal mines, with the exception of full-faced CMMs 
(MSHA, 2015). Full-face CMMs mine the entire width of an entry and have integral roof 
bolting equipment, which require miners to ride onboard the machine. Proximity detection 
systems feature several (typically four) electromagnetic field generators installed on CMM 
machines, while miners wear personal alarm devices (PADs). The governing principle is that 
the closer a PAD-equipped miner gets to the CMM, the higher the electromagnetic field 
strength. When a miner is detected in hazardous proximity to the CMM, the proximity 
detection system first provides a visual and audible warning to indicate a warning zone 
incursion, then if the miner enters the stop zone, it completely halts all machine tram and 
conveyor boom functionality.
The shapes and sizes of these zones represent predefined distances from the machine, and 
are configured via hardware settings or software. The zones are static except when the CMM 
is cutting coal. Known as mining mode, this feature reduces the zones toward the rear of the 
machine to allow the operator to get out of the way of oncoming shuttle cars. Note that 
machine motions that could harm the operator (such as a conveyor boom swing) are not 
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prevented during mining mode. Figure 3 illustrates an example set of warning and stop 
zones. For the remainder of this article, systems with zones of this type will be referred to as 
conventional proximity detection systems.
NIOSH researchers have developed the intelligent proximity detection (iPD) system, which 
differs from conventional systems in that it utilizes multiple stop zones to selectively disable 
potentially dangerous machine motions while allowing safe motions to continue 
uninterrupted. This is accomplished by utilizing all of a CMM’s generators to determine the 
position of the miner relative to the machine through trilateration, whereas conventional 
proximity detection system zone incursions are a result of a high electromagnetic reading 
when a miner gets within a predefined distance of the CMM.
By defining specific zones in which only select machine actions are prevented when a miner 
is present, the iPD system provides operators more latitude to safely position themselves 
around the CMM to best perform their work. The additional freedom may lead to safer, more 
efficient CMM operation by providing the operator and other crew members more flexibility 
while performing tasks near the CMM, and by preventing unintentional machine shutdowns 
associated with conventional proximity detection systems when a miner enters the stop zone.
Ultimately, these advantages also help to build miner acceptance of proximity detection 
systems. While iPD systems have not yet been implemented in commercially available 
proximity detection systems, the intention of the iPD design is to provide worker protection 
at least equivalent to conventional proximity detection while giving miners more flexibility 
to perform their work.
Intelligent Proximity: Zone Configurations
This article presents two iPD zone configurations. Neither is presented as a 
recommendation; rather, they are examples for comparing factors associated with 
establishing zone definitions. The first, iPD 1, is shown in Figure 4 (p. 74). Zones 1 and 2 
are dynamic, meaning that they follow the position of the conveyor boom as it pivots 
laterally to load coal onto haulage equipment. Zones 3 through 10 are static and based on the 
CMM chassis (frame).
Each zone is associated with a set of CMM functions that are disabled whenever a miner is 
detected within that zone. The logic governing which functions are disabled is shown in 
Table 1 (p. 74). NIOSH researchers designed this zone layout as an example of one potential 
configuration for selective machine function shutdown (Carr & DuCarme, 2013; Carr, Jobes, 
Lutz, et al., 2015; DuCarme, Carr & Reyes, 2013; Jobes, Carr & DuCarme, 2011; Jobes, 
Carr & DuCarme, 2012).
The 10 zones were created to capture all possible machine motions that could affect a given 
location, and to provide zone logic to allow operators to perform actions that would not put 
them at risk. For example, different machine actions would be disabled for a miner standing 
in Zone 4 compared to a miner standing in Zone 6, due to the pivot point of the machine 
(intersection of Zones 4–7).
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The second zone configuration, iPD 2, is shown in Figure 5. Zones 1, 2, 11 and 12 are 
dynamic and change based on the position of the conveyor boom. Zones 3 through 10 and 13 
are static and based on the CMM chassis. Table 2 describes the zone logic for iPD 2. Major 
differences between the two configurations include:
1. The functions blocked by Zones 1 and 2 in iPD 2 depend on the position 
of the conveyor swing. If the conveyor is centered (within a preset 
tolerance), the functions blocked are less restrictive than if the conveyor is 
swung either left or right.
2. Forward and reverse tram functions in iPD 2 are blocked for Zones 4 
through 9 to prevent incidents when a miner is beside the CMM.
3. All tram functions in iPD 2 are blocked for Zones 6 and 7 to prevent any 
unsafe pivoting motions.
4. Zone 11 has been added to iPD 2 to account for the area that exists 
between Zones 1 and 2 around the conveyor boom. This prevents any 
unsafe conveyor boom motions when an operator is near the tail by 
providing a buffer between Zones 1 and 2.
5. Zones 12 and 13 have been added to iPD 2 to account for a miner being on 
top of the CMM.
Investigation Methodology
To gain insight into the safety potentially afforded by different proximity detection zone 
configurations, NIOSH researchers conducted an analysis of 39 fatalities that occurred 
between 1984 and 2015 in which a miner was struck or pinned by a CMM in an 
underground U.S. mine. The objectives of this analysis were to estimate the number of cases 
for which a proximity detection system may have prevented the incident, and to identify the 
potential safety benefits of iPD systems compared to conventional systems.
MSHA fatality investigation reports were reviewed and analyzed for each incident to 
determine whether a conventional or iPD system could have prevented the fatality. Although 
it is mandated that all machine tram and conveyor boom functionality is shut down when a 
miner enters any stop zone around a CMM, for the purposes of this analysis it was assumed 
that all machine functions would be shut down on a commercial proximity detection system 
based on manufacturer designs. Additionally, it is assumed that iPD systems would 
selectively disable machine functions as previously described. In considering conventional 
proximity detection, it is assumed that all machine motion would be blocked when a miner is 
detected in any stop zone, while iPD systems would selectively disable machine functions as 
previously described.
As one example, on Nov. 17, 2012, a CMM operator was pinned while backing the machine 
out of the first cut of a crosscut that was being developed. According to the MSHA 
investigation report, the operator was pinned between the left side of the cutting drum and 
rib (side of coal pillar; Figure 6, p. 77). Based on the fatality position as indicated in the 
report, the operator likely pivoted the machine, which resulted in the incident.
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NIOSH analysis concluded that a conventional proximity detection system could have 
prevented this incident, as the machine would have shut down once the operator entered the 
stop zone. For both iPD 1 and iPD 2 zone configurations, the operator would have been in 
Zone 9; analysis further concluded that both intelligent zone configurations could have 
prevented the incident, as the pivoting actions would have been prevented (left tracks only 
reverse, or left tracks reverse and right tracks forward would have been disabled).
Evaluating Past Incidents to Assess Fatality Reduction Potential
The MSHA report for each of the 39 fatal incidents was evaluated to determine if 
conventional or either of the two iPD systems could have prevented the fatality. The most 
important element for each incident is the victim’s location relative to the CMM (i.e., zone). 
Clear, specific information is not available in the reports for all cases, therefore, for some 
fatalities multiple zones are identified as possible locations of the victim at the time of the 
incident. Similarly, all possible machine motions that may have caused the incident were 
identified.
Given the mandate that all machine tram and boom functionality be shut down when a miner 
enters a stop zone, for the purposes of this analysis it was assumed that all machine 
functions would be shut down on a commercial proximity detection system based on 
manufacturer designs. For each of the two proposed intelligent system configurations, if the 
associated logic would have blocked the possible hazardous machine motions identified, it is 
assumed that the system would have prevented the incident and the resulting fatal injury. The 
results of this analysis are shown in Tables 3 and 4 (pp. 76–77).
Conclusion
Operating or working with CMMs is one of the most hazardous jobs in an underground coal 
mine. Miners have been fatally struck or pinned by a CMM 39 times since 1984. MSHA has 
mandated that all CMMs (except full-faced CMMs) be equipped with commercially 
available proximity detection systems to improve miner safety by preventing the CMM from 
contacting a miner and also by providing audible and visual warnings to alert the miner 
when in an unsafe zone.
NIOSH researchers have developed a prototype iPD that aims to provide equivalent safety to 
conventional proximity detection systems while improving the operational efficiency of the 
system. This is accomplished by disabling only unsafe actions and allowing operators more 
freedom to position themselves to accomplish their work. To evaluate the safety performance 
of conventional and intelligent systems, the research team reviewed and analyzed the 39 
fatal incidents involving CMMs.
The study results indicate that 82% of the fatalities could have been prevented by 
conventional systems. Two different iPD zone configurations were presented to illustrate the 
different factors that affect performance and both were analyzed over the same set of 39 fatal 
incidents. This showed that iPD 2 could have prevented 82% of the fatality cases (the same 
as conventional proximity), while iPD 1 could have been a preventive factor in only 62% of 
the incidents.
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This indicates that by implementing iPD into commercially available proximity detection 
systems, miners could have the safety benefits of proximity detection systems while 
potentially having more freedom to move around the machine. They may also be able to 
work more efficiently, thus potentially enhancing acceptance of the systems. The results of 
the analyses were based on MSHA investigation reports. While sufficient incident data are 
not available to yield statistically validated conclusions, the analyses performed provide 
insight into the effectiveness of proximity detection systems.
While iPD 2 appeared to be superior to iPD 1 in this particular study, due to the iPD 1 zone 
logic definitions that allowed for tramming motions when a miner is detected on the side of 
the CMM, the comparison more importantly illustrates that zone configuration definitions 
are critical to proximity detection system effectiveness. Ultimately, neither iPD 1 nor iPD 2 
should be considered recommended designs, but rather, examples of how the zones for an 
intelligent proximity detection system could be configured, and how different parameters 
affect the ability to prevent worker injury. It should also be noted that many other factors can 
influence the performance of proximity detection systems, such as conveyor elevation, 
cutting drum elevation, tramming and mining mode (Carr, et al., 2015). These factors should 
also be taken into consideration when designing zone configurations for intelligent 
proximity systems.
While proximity detection systems operating on the electromagnetic principle have been 
developed specifically for underground coal mining equipment, this technology can be 
applicable in various industries where other localization-based sensing technologies, such as 
GPS, are not feasible. Additionally, electromagnetic proximity detection could be integrated 
into existing systems to enhance the localization and detection capabilities of humans and 
machinery through sensor fusion. Possible examples include surface mining, construction 
sites, oil and gas exploration, agriculture and crop management, warehousing and 
distribution, and underwater exploration.
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• Underground coal extraction commonly utilizes remote-controlled 
crawler-mounted heavy equipment known as continuous mining 
machines that cut coal from the solid formation.
• Miners working with or near these machines are regularly exposed to 
the risk of serious injury from being struck or pinned.
• Based on an analysis of 39 fatalities involving continuous mining 
machines, it is estimated that proximity detection systems can help 
prevent such injuries by preventing hazardous machine movements.
• Design of proximity detection zones significantly affects the 
effectiveness of intelligent proximity detection systems.
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Room & Pillar Mining Method
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Conventional Proximity Detection System Zones
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iPD 1 Zone Configuration
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iPD 2 Zone Configuration
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Location of Operator Fatality
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Example of a CMM showing the cutting drum.
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Table 1
iPD 1 Zone Configuration Logic
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Table 2
iPD 2 Zone Configuration Logic
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(1)
Proximity detection is not likely to have been a preventive factor since the incident occurred during maintenance. These systems as designed 
may interfere with various maintenance tasks and are unlikely to be used.
(2)
This incident occurred on a full-face CMM (cutting drum spans the entire width of an entry) with an integrated roof bolter. The bolter operator 
was pinned when he exited the onboard cab. A system with a silent zone (designated zone where a mine worker is allowed) may have been effective 
if designed for full-face CMMs.
(3)
This incident occurred on a CMM with a mobile bridge conveyor system (continuous haulage). Special design considerations would be 
necessary to adapt proximity detection to accommodate the presence of continuous haulage equipment while still providing worker protection.




















NIOSH analysis iPD 1 iPD 2
Percent of fatalities in which proximity detection
was likely to have been a preventive factor
82% 62% 82%
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